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Landowner Liability (continued from page 85)
gence.
The Colorado Supreme Court
first considered Gallegos' claim
that section 13-21-115 violated the
protections provided by the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution, U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1, and the due
process clause of the Colorado
Constitution, Colo. Const. art. II, §
25. The first section of the fourteenth amendment provides that
"no state shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Article II,
section 25, of the Colorado Constitution "guarantees that all parties
who are similarly situated receive
like treatment by the law." Colo.
Const. art. II, § 25. Since the
statute did not infringe on a fundamental right, a suspect class, or a
classification triggering an intermediate standard of review, the
court determined that in order to
prevail in his claim that section
13-21-115 was unconstitutional,
Gallegos had to prove that the
section 13-21-115 had no rational
basis in fact and bore no rational
relationship to a legitimate Colorado state interest. To determine
whether Gallegos met his burden,
the court used a two part test. First,
the court ascertained the legitimate
state interest that section
13-21-115 was intended to promote. Next, the court determined
whether the statute actually promoted that interest.
Purpose of Landowner Liability Statute. The court ascertained
the Colorado legislature's purpose
in enacting section 13-21-115 by
reviewing the history of Colorado
landowner liability law, the circumstances surrounding the statute's enactment, and the intentions
expressed by the legislators who
sponsored the legislation in the
General Assembly. The court noted that prior to 1971, Colorado
followed the common law with
respect to landowner liability. The
common law traditionally imposed
upon landowners a greater duty of
care towards invitees than licensees or trespassers. For example, a
landowner was merely required to
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refrain from willfully or wantonly
injuring a licensee, but the landowner had an affirmative duty to
make his land reasonably safe for
invitees.
In 1971, the Colorado Supreme Court abolished the use of
the common law distinctions between licensees, invitees, and trespassers, and imposed a general
standard of care upon landowners.
Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich,
175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308
(1971). Under this more general
standard, a landowner was simply
required to manage his land as a
reasonable person would in view of
the foreseeability of injuries to
others. However, in 1986, the Colorado legislature noted that the
reasonable person standard established by Mile High Fence led to
unpredictable and inequitable results, especially with regard to trespassers. Therefore, the legislature
enacted section 13-21-115.
The Colorado legislature expressly enacted section 13-21-115
to promote responsibility among
both landowners and those upon
the land by re-establishing the
common law distinction among
trespassers, licensees, and invitees,
and defining a landowner's duty of
care according to the landowner's
relationship to the person upon his
land. The court in the present case
found that this purpose addressed
a legitimate state interest, and
thereby satisfied the first part of
the two part test.
Promoting the State's Interest. The court next addressed
whether section 13-21-115 promoted the state's interest. The
court examined the language of the
section as it pertained to licensees
and invitees and determined that
section 13-21-115 inverted a landowner's duties, as compared to the
common law, by according a higher degree of protection to a licensee
than an invitee. This result defeated the Colorado legislature's intent
of re-establishing the common law
scheme of landowner liability. It
also contradicted logical reasoning
which requires a landowner to take
more precautions to protect someone he has invited on his land for

his own purposes, than a person
whose presence is merely permitted. The court held that section
13-21-115 could not be interpreted
to fairly allocate responsibility
within the limitations imposed by
the federal and state constitutional
guarantees of equal protection of
the law, and was, therefore, unconstitutional.
Because the verdict against
Gallegos was based on Red Ram's
duties toward Gallegos under section 13-21-115, the court reversed
the judgment and remanded the
case for a new trial under the
standard of liability imposed prior
to the enactment of section
13-21-115.
Karen M. Cichowski

TAMPONS AND
SANITARY NAPKINS
ARE MEDICAL
APPLIANCES EXEMPT
FROM CHICAGO
SALES TAX
In Geary v. Dominick's Finer
Foods, Inc., 129 Ill.2d 389, 544
N.E.2d 344 (1989), purchasers of
female hygenic products ("the purchasers") brought a class action
suit alleging that the City of Chicago illegally taxed tampons and sanitary napkins purchased from various retailers. The Illinois Supreme
Court found that because the products were necessities with no substitutes, the purchasers had no
choice but to pay the taxes. Therefore, the court held that the purchasers, having paid under duress,
could challenge the tax. On the
merits, the court held that tampons
and sanitary napkins were "medical appliances" and exempt from
the city sales tax.
Background
The purchasers' class action
suit alleged that the Illinois Department of Revenue, the City of
Chicago, the Chicago Department
of Revenue, and the Regional
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Transportation Authority ("the
city") charged illegal taxes on tampons and sanitary napkins purchased from Dominick's Finer
Foods, Inc., Jewel Food Stores,
Inc., Walgreens Company, and K
mart Corporation ("the retailers").
Before the trial court, the city and
the retailers sought to dismiss the
purchasers' claim, arguing that the
purchasers could not recover because they had voluntarily paid the
taxes. The trial court held that the
purchasers sufficiently showed
that they paid the taxes under
duress. Consequently, the trial
,court denied the city and retailers'
motion to strike and dismiss the
claim.
At the city and retailers' request, the trial court certified three
questions for review, which the
appellate court consolidated into
two issues: (1) whether, by alleging
that tampons and sanitary napkins
were necessities, the purchasers
sufficiently pleaded duress under
the voluntary payment doctrine;
and (2) whether tampons and sanitary napkins qualified as "medical
appliances" and were exempt from
the Chicago Sales Tax Ordinance
("the ordinance"). Chicago Municipal Code § 200.6 (1984).
In reversing the trial court's
decision on the first issue, the
appellate court held that merely
pleading that an item is a necessity
does not adequately demonstrate
duress. The appellate court did not
address the second issue. The Illinois Supreme Court granted the
purchasers' motion to appeal.
Illinois Supreme Court:
Duress and Voluntary Payment
The court first examined the
voluntary-payment doctrine. Under this doctrine, a taxpayer cannot recover taxes voluntarily paid,
even if the taxes were imposed
illegally. A taxpayer has paid taxes
involuntarily if, at the time of
payment, he did not know the facts
upon which to protest the taxes, or
if he paid the taxes under duress.
The court noted that paying under
protest was the usual means by
which taxpayers indicated that
they were not paying a tax voluntarily. However, whether the plaintiffs actually protested the taxes
was irrelevant to a finding of duVolume 2, Number 3/Spring, 1990

ress because the absence of protest
does not establish a voluntary payment.
The court discussed two cases
in determining whether the purchasers, by alleging that tampons
and sanitary napkins are necessities, sufficiently pleaded duress under the voluntary- payment doctrine. In Getto v. City of Chicago,
86 Ill. 2d 39, 426 N.E.2d 844
(1981), the plaintiff challenged a
telephone service tax and claimed
that he paid the tax involuntarily.
He argued that the payments were
made under duress because he
feared his telephone service would
be disconnected. The defendants
noted that the plaintiff paid the
taxes without protest and could
have resolved the dispute with the
Illinois Commerce Commission
without risking termination of his
service. The.Getto court found that
telephone service was a necessity
and that protesting to the Commission would have been pointless
because the Commission had approved the telephone service tax.
Therefore, the Getto court held
that the voluntary payment doctrine did not apply because the
plaintiff paid the tax under duress.
Similarly, in Ross v. City of
Geneva, 71 Ill. 2d 27, 373 N.E.2d
1342 (1978), the plaintiff challenged a surcharge imposed on his
electric bill. He paid the bill but
indicated on his check that he was
paying under protest. The Ross
court held that because he was
faced with the choice of paying the
bill or having his electricity terminated, the plaintiff paid the tax
under duress.
Duress: Nature of Service and
Consequence of Nonpayment
The Geary court found that the
Getto and Ross decisions controlled on the issue of duress. The
court stated that in both cases it
was the relationship between the
nature of the service and the consequence of nonpayment that was
significant. The court said that if
the service had not been a necessity
or if the service would not have
been terminated for nonpayment,
then the plaintiffs in Getto and
Ross would not have been found to
have paid under duress.
The court found that similar

to the invention of the telephone
and electricity, the invention of
sanitary napkins and tampons created a reliance on these products.
The court stated that like any other
retail purchase, a customer had to
pay the taxes on tampons and
sanitary napkins or the retailer
would refuse to sell the products.
Finding no substitute product for
tampons and sanitary napkins, the
court labeled the products necessities.
The court rejected the city
and retailers' argument that the
purchasers had to plead that they
could not purchase the products
elsewhere without paying the taxes. The court reasoned that all
stores had to comply with the city
or state sales tax laws. Also, the
court refused to require the purchasers to plead that they had tried
unsuccessfully to purchase the
products without paying the taxes.
In Getto, the plaintiff was not
required to protest to the Illinois
Commerce Commission because
the Commission had already approved the tax. Similarly, in the
present case, the purchasers were
not required to attempt to purchase tampons and sanitary napkins without paying taxes because
that attempt was sure to fail. The
court noted that in this case the
purchasers had no immediate relief other than to pay the taxes. If
the purchasers refused to pay the
taxes, retailers would refuse to sell
the products. Because the products
were necessary, the possibility that
retailers would refuse to sell was a
sufficiently immediate and significant injury to constitute duress. In
addition, the court held that the
retailers had actual or threatened
power over the purchasers. Although the retailers had not actually refused to sell the products to the
purchasers, retailers routinely refuse to sell products to consumers
who do not pay the charged sales
tax.

"Medical Appliances" Exemption
from Chicago Sales Tax
The court next addressed
whether tampons and sanitary
napkins were exempt from the city
sales tax. The city's ordinance imposed a tax on tangible personal
(continued on page 88)
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Tampons Exempt From Sales Tax (continued from page 87)
property, but exempted "medical
appliances" from the tax. Chicago
Municipal Code § 200.6-4 (1984).
However, the Chicago Department
of Revenue ("the Chicago department") did not define "medical
applicances" to expressly include
tampons and sanitary napkins.
The State of Illinois exempted
"medical appliances" from its ReTax
Occupation
tailers'
(Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 120, para. 441
(1985)) and Use Tax (Ill.Rev.Stat.
ch. 120, para. 439.3 (1985)). The
Illinois Department of Revenue
("the Illinois department") definition of "medical applicances" was
nearly identical to the Chicago
department's definition. In 1985,
the Illinois department began construing "medical appliances" to
include tampons and sanitary napkins, thus exempting them from
taxes. The city continued to tax
these products.
The purchasers challenged the
Chicago department's failure to
interpret "medical appliances" to
include tampons and sanitary napkins. The city and retailers argued
that tampons and sanitary napkins
were only used for hygienic purposes and should be considered
nonmedical appliances. The court
pointed out that tampons and sanitary napkins perform an absorbent
function similar to cotton and bandaids, two products that were considered "medical appliances" under the city ordinance.
Furthermore, the court noted
that when the state exempted soft
drinks from its taxes the city
amended its ordinance to exclude
soft drinks. In doing so, the Chicago City Council and the Chicago
department indicated their intent
to enforce the ordinance consistent
with Illinois tax law. The court
found the Chicago department's
refusal to exempt tampons and
sanitary napkins from the ordinance to be against the expressed
intent of the Chicago City Council
in passing the ordinance. Accordingly, the court held that tampons
and sanitary napkins were "medical appliances" and exempt from
the city tax.
Michael I. Leonard
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GEORGIA CITY
ORDINANCE
REQUIRING TOWING
SERVICES TO ACCEPT
CHECKS HELD
CONSTITUTIONAL
In Porter v. City of Atlanta,
384 S.E.2d 631 (Ga. 1989), the
Supreme Court of Georgia held
constitutional city ordinances requiring towing service operators to
post signs indicating towing fees
and to accept payment by insured
checks and credit cards.
Background
A-Tow, Inc. ("A-Tow") was a
towing company owned and operated by Val J. Porter ("Porter").
A-Tow and Porter were convicted
of violating two Atlanta ordinances by failing to accept checks and to
post towing rates. A-Tow and Porter appealed the convictions and
challenged the constitutionality of
the ordinances.
City's Authority to
Enact Ordinances
On appeal A-Tow and Porter
challenged the validity of the city
ordinances, contending that Atlanta lacked the power to regulate
businesses. To determine the ordinances' validity, the supreme court
applied a two-pronged analysis: (1)
whether the city possessed the
power to enact the ordinances and,
(2) if the power existed, whether
the exercise of power was clearly
reasonable.
The court noted that a municipality's power to regulate private
enterprise is one of its most significant, but controversial, powers.
The court emphasized, however,
that the controversy was not the
result of uncertainty concerning
the source of a city's power to
regulate trade: that power is firmly
embedded in the right of the legislature to regulate trade and to
authorize cities to do so. Rather,
the controversy stemmed from
courts' inconsistent analysis of

whether such regulations are reasonable.
Power To Enact Ordinances
In its analysis of the ordinances, the court found that three sections of the Atlanta city charter
authorized the city to regulate towing and wrecker services. First, the
city charter provided the city with
the general authority to license and
regulate "privileges, occupations,
trade and professions." Atlanta,
Ga., City Charter, app. I, § (2). In
addition to this general authority,
the charter supplied the city with
the specific authority to regulate
city businesses that "may be dangerous to persons or property"
(Atlanta Ga., City Charter, app. I, §
(18)), and to "regulate and license
vehicles operated for hire . . . and
parking" (Atlanta, Ga., City Charter, app. I, § (37)). The court
concluded that the city possessed
the power to enact towing and
wrecking service regulations.
Reasonable Exercise of Power
Having established that the
ordinances satisfied the first prong,
the court analyzed the ordinances'
reasonableness. The court noted
that the purpose behind the power
to regulate is to allow the governing
authorities to shield the public
from the excesses of private entities and their activities. The extent
of government control must not
exceed the danger of the regulated
activity because although private
interest can pose a danger of abuse,
excessive government control in
the name of protectionism can
pose an even greater danger.
Because both the government
and the private sector are potential
sources of abuse, courts must carefully view the exercise of government regulatory power over private activities. Such regulations
are not presumed to be reasonable,
but must be demonstrated to be
reasonable after the protection the
regulation affords the public is
balanced against the oppressiveness imposed on individual rights.
In determining the reasonableness of the ordinances, the
court initially examined the nature
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